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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
On January. 16, 1978, the appellant was convicted of
aggravated robbery and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of five years to life in the Utah State Prison.

The appellant

was then placed on probation and a stay of execution of sentence
was granted until March 16, 1979.

On June 1, 1979, after a

hearing, the appellant's probation was revoked and he was
conunitted to the Utah State Prison to serve his original
sentence.

On August 27, 1979, the appellant filed a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus.

The present action is an appeal

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from an order granting the respondent's motion to dismiss
and denying the petition for the issuance of the writ with
prejudice.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On June 1, 1979, at a hearing held before the
Honorable Jay E. Banks, the appellant's probation was revoked
and he was committed to the Utah State Prison to serve an
indeterminate term of from five years to life.

On August 27,

1979, the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and a hearing was scheduled to convene before the
Honorable David K. Winder.

On October 25, 1979, both parties

were ordered to file a memorandum on the issues involved.
The respondent thereafter moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.

On December 6, 1979 in a memorandum decision

the Honorable David K. Winder granted the respondent's motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the appellant's probation was
properly revoked and that the record provided a sufficient
written basis as to the evidence and reasons relied upon for
revoking appellant's probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's
order granting the motion to dismiss the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, and affirmance of the trial court's order
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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revoking the appellant's probation.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 15, 1978, pursuant to a plea of guilty
to the crime of aggravated robbery, the appellant was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment of from five years to life by the
Honorable Jay E. Banks (R. at 27).

The execution of the sen-

tence was stayed and the appellant was placed on probation
conditioned on several factors, one of which being that he
have no weapons in his possession (R. at 27) .
On or about May 6, 2979, Salt Lake City police officers
had occasion to observe the appellant outside of the Elks Club
(T. at 3).

At that time, the officers had observed the appel-

lant urinating on the side of the building (T. at 3).

The

officers then called the appellant over to the patrol car where
he was briefly searched and informed that he was being placed
under arrest for obscene conduct (T. at 4,5,15).

The appellant

was then transported to the Salt Lake County jail by officers
James Yontz and Kevin Kenna; Officer Yontz was driving, the
appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat, and Officer
Kenna was sitting in the back seat behind the appellant (T. at
27, 28).

Upon arrival at the jail, the front passenger door

was opened and the appellant was assisted out of the car.

It

was at that time that Officer Yontz noticed a gun on the floor
of the car between the front passenger's seat and the door
(T. at 6, 28).

Later, at the appellant's probation
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revocation hearing, it was adduced that although the officers
had transported another person sitting in that same seat, to
the jail, a search of the seating area previous to the time
the appellant had been picked up, failed to yield the existence of the gun. (T. at 24, 26).

It was not until after appel-

lant was taken to the jail, that the weapon was discovered.
There after on May 14, 1979, the appellant's probation agent filed an affidavit stating that the appellant
had violated the conditions of his probation by having been
in possession of a firearm on or about May 6, 1979 in violation
of U.C.A. § 76-10-503, and by having concealed upon his person
a firearm in violation of U.C.A. § 76-10-504.

On May 17, 1979

an order to show cause issued and a hearing was scheduled for
May 21, 1979.

At that hearing, the appellant denied the

allegations and the hearing was continued to May 29, 1979 and
June 1, 1979 at which time the court found the appellant to
be in violation of the terms of his probation.

The court then

ordered the appellant committed to the Utah State Prison to
serve his original sentence.

A transcript of the probation

revocation proceedings was appropriately preserved.
On July 31, 1979, the appellant came to trial on the
alleged violations of U.C.A. § 76-10-503 and U.C.A. § 76-10-504
before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin.

After the jury was
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sworn, count two of the information was dismissed, and the
appellant pleaded not guilty. On August 1, 1979, the jury
found the appellant not guilty.
On August 27, 1979 the appellant filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been unconstitutionally detained since he had been subsequently acquitted
of the charges which were the basis of his probation revocation,
and the court erred in not entering written findings of fact
(R. at 2, 3, 4).

On October 25, 1979, the Honorable David K.

Winder ordered each party to file a memorandum on the issues
involved (R. at 10).

Both parties complied with this order

and subsequently thereto, the respondent filed a motion to
dismiss on November 27, 1979

(R. at 23).

On December 6, 1979

the court, in a memorandum decision, granted the respondent's
motion to dismiss and denied with prejudice the issuance of
the writ (R. at 24, 25).

The court stated that it found the

appellant's probation to have been properly revoked and the
record of the revocation hearing to be a sufficient written
basis as to the reasons relied upon for revocation to meet
due process requirements

(R. at 24).

The court subsequently

on December 19, 1979 entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law resulting from the habeas corpus proceedings
27, 28, 29).

(R. at 26,

The court then entered the appropriate order

(R. at 30, 31).
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ARGUMENT
APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY DENIED HABEAS
CORPUS RELIEF BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL DENIAL OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WHEN NO WRITTEN FINDINGS WERE
ENTERED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN REVOKING
APPELLANT'S PROBATION.
The United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489

(1972), held that before parole

may be revoked, certain minimum requirements of due process
must be met.

The Court stated that these requirements include:

[(A)] written notice of the claimed
violations of par6le; (b) disclo~ure
to the parolee of evidence against
him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation) ; (e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of
wh~ch need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement
by the fact finders as to the evidence
relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
Such requirements were adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,411 U.S. 778

(1973), and applied

to probation revocation hearings. Id at 786.

Accordingly,

since the Court found that the revocation of probation is
constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of
parole (see footnote 3 at 782), it (the Court) applied the
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language used in Morrissey to probation revocation proceedings.
The Court in Morrissey said of the requirements for parole
revocation that: "We have no thought to create an inflexible
structure for parole revocation procedures."

(at 490).

So

too may this language be applied to probation revocation
procedures.
Nevertheless Respondent submits that the requirement
that the court provide written findings of the facts relied
upon for revoking probation was fulfilled by the court's
verbal statement and hearing transcript.
It is important to note that the holdings in
Morrissey and Gagnon resulted from decisions of revocation
made by administrative boards of probation and parole, not
by judicial hearing bodies.

In most cases, the probationer

or parolee did not have the benefit of the assistance of
counsel at such hearings.

The court therefore held that

these administrative boards were to provide written findings
of fact to the accused to aid him in prosecuting an appeal to
a court of review.

The case at bar presents a distinguishable

setting from earlier precedents.

In the instant case, the

hearing was had before a judicial officer, a judge, and the
appellant was represented by trained counsel.

When presented

with these circumstances, the court in People v. Scott, App.,
110 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405, 406,

(1973) made the following reply
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where the appellant's sole contention was that he was denied
due process since no written findings were made:
The proceedings held in open court
in the case at bench which have been
recorded by the official reporter serve
the same purpose . . . (at 405)
It is obvious that the circumstances
that require written findings in a parole
revocation proceeding in a prison do not
obtain in a hearing held in open court,
which has been fully reported, and where
the usual constitutional right to counsel
has been given.
We hold that in a proceeding for
revocation of probation the making of
written findings of fact is not an indispensible concomitant of due process if
there is a substantially equivalent substitute
therefore, such as appears from the official
reporter's transcript of the oral proceedings
in the case at bench, and that the defendant
here was not deprived of due process. (at 406).
The court in State v. Jaworski, 234 N.W.2d 221, 222, 223 (Neb.
1975) came to the same conclusion in its analysis of Morrissey
and Gagnon:
Morrissey and Gagnon were applied to
a form of administrative hearing. They
did not directly deal with judicial pro. bation and judicial revocation as provided
in the Nebraska Probation Administration
Act . . . The Morrissey and Gagnon requirement of a written statement does not fit the
pattern of a judicial hearing in a court of
record where proceedings, findings, and
judgments are recorded and subject to appellate
review.
The differences are further emphasized
where a specific charge or information is
filed by a prosecutor, and the defendant is
represented by counsel.
It would be strange
indeed if the formal requirements of fact
finding and determination of guilt were to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be more strict at a probation revocation
hearing than at an original criminal trial.
Neither the Nebraska Probation Administration Act nor Morrissey or Gagnon require
the District Court to specify which exhibits
or which witnesses were relied upon for its
written findings.
The respondent's position is further supported by the conclusion reached in State v. Fortier, Ore. App., 533 P.2d 187
(1975) where the court stated that:
After analyzing the arguments of
both counsel we have come to the same
conclusion reached in Moreno, namely,
that a written statement of the evidence
is not required under the circumstances
here .
. Inasmuch as there was a full
record of the evidence and prodeedings on
which the Lane County Circuit Court based
its decision to revoke probation in this
case, there was no necessity to require
the court to give defendant a written
statement of the evidence upon which the
court's action was based.
See also State v. Moreno, Ariz. App., 520 P.2d 1139 (1974), and
State v. Marlar, Ariz. App., 511 P .. 2d 204
238 N.W.2d 237

(Neb. 1976).

(1974), State v. McFarlar

The Washington State Supreme Court ir

State v. Myers, 545 P.2d 538, 544

(Wash. 1976), not only spoke

directly to the issue, but also spoke directly to the appellant's
relief sought on appeal when it stated:
The appellant's second argument
is that he was denied due process by
the failure of the judge at the revocation hearing to make written findings
of fact.
This contention, however, does
not stand scrutiny because the judge's
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oral opinion, transcribed in the
statement of facts, provides an
ample record of the evidence on
which the judge relied and the
reasons for the revocation. Thus,
the absence of specific written
findings did not hinder appellant
in making his appeal since the oral
opinion provided a record sufficient
for review. A remand for the purpose
of entering formal written findings
would serve no useful purpose. Under
these circumstances, the failure to
enter written findings of fact did
not result in a denial of appellant's
due process rights.
Thus the respondent submits that these authorities
are dispositive of the sole issue posed by the appellant's
brief.

Moreover, even if this Court should find that the

trial court's failure to enter special written findings, was
error, the error was harmless and does not render the probation revocation hearing invalid.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-53-2

states that: "Neither a departure from the form or mode
prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceedin
shall render it invalid unless it shall have actually prejudice
the defendant in respect to a substantial right."

The appellan

alleges no such prejudice to a substantial right.

Furthermore,

the appellant himself explicitly shows that no such prejudice
occurred since it is obvious from his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus that the appellant had been adequately informed c
the reasons why his probation was revoked (R. at 2, 3, 4).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

The appellant tacitly concedes that, with the
exception of the issue at bar, his due process rights were
fully protected at the revocation hearing: the appellant had
notice of the alleged grounds for revocation by the affidavit
and order to show cause; he was present with counsel at the
hearing where he presented a defense and called and crossexamined witnesses; the hearing was before a neutral and
detached judicial officer;and, the appellant was sufficiently
apprised as to why his probation had been revoked by the
judge and the hearing transcript.
The appellant cites no valid authorities in support
of his argument that his due process rights were violated.
The appellant's reliance on this Court's ruling in Farrell v.
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971), is misplaced.
That case involved a woman who pleaded guilty to a violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-50-6.

The trial court there suspended

the execution of the sentence and placed the defendant on
probation for a period of two years.

Soon thereafter the

conditions of probation were violated and after notice and
hearing, the defendant's probation was revoked.

The defendant

then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and thereafter appealed from its dismissal.

The opinion of the court

in upholding the dismissal of the petition, refers to Rule
52(a), U.R.C.P. and specifically to findings of fact in
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habeas corpus

proceedin~s.

This Court never meant to require

the blanket application of a rule mandating that special
written findings of fact be entered in all types of proceedings
The opinion was limited in its application to habeas corpus
proceedings.

Thus, since the court in the habeas corpus

proceedings in the present case promulgated special written
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. at 26, 27, 28, 29),
there is no merit to the appellant's reliance on the authority
he has cited.
The appellant further misplaces his reliance on
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979) which was an appeal
from a civil dispute between a home-owner and a non-licensed
contractor he had hired to construct an addition to his home.
When it was found that much of the work on the house was done
in an unworkrnanlike manner, the
damages.

home~owner

filed a suit for

The trial court awarded the home-owner two thousand

dollars in damages and he appealed seeking an increase in the
award.

The trial court in that case did file specific findings

of fact but this Court remanded the case for additional finding
since the findings of record were not sufficiently detailed to
allow the Court to decide the issue.
As can readily be observed~ the authority the appella
has cited has no application to the issue here in question.
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CONCLUSION
The respondent maintains that the appellant's due
process rights were respected in every way during the probation revocation proceedings.

In view of the authorities

cited and the arguments set forth, the appellant has failed
to show the commission of a reversible error by the trial
judge in not making specific findings of fact and specific
findings of the reasons for revocation of the appellant's
probation.

In view of the fact that existing statutory law

and case law was complied with at every step of the proceedings, the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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